Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 justified the economic reforms by arguing that China was at an early stage of socialism and needed to adopt market policies to boost economic growth before a more egalitarian socialist society could be created -a theory that became known as Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 中国特色社会主义.
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has reaffirmed the centrality of In the Yunnan locality where the dinner took place, the local economic situation was dire. Over the past two decades, tourism had taken over from mining as Yunnan's main economic driver, allowing private enterprise to flourish and outpace the SOEs that had previously dominated the local economy. In Zhongdian -a county in Diqing Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture that changed its name to Shangri-la in 2001 -local authorities offered tax breaks and other concessions to tourism-related enterprises.
One firm helped the county develop and promote a circuit of scenic spots, including a gorge along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, a series of SOE-led construction of a 180 km above-ground freeway between Shangri-la and Lijiang Image: Ben Hillman 300 301
The State Advances, the Private Sector Retreats Ben Hillman limestone terraces, and a turquoise-blue lake ringed by forest. At each site, the company managed visitor access, making improvements to paths and steps, and erecting ticket gates to collect entrance fees. In return for an agreed annual rent to the county government, the company collected and kept all the revenue from ticket sales. 
Cleaning Up
The private sector boom rolled on until Xi came to power in 2012. Xi's anticorruption campaign hit hard as extravagant local government spending, including on state-sponsored travel, was reigned in, and the local gift economy shrank. These developments, and a crackdown on dodgy tour operators in 2015, dealt a major blow to the local tourism industry. 12 Yunnan had become notorious for cut-price holiday packages, which unscrupulous operators often sold below actual cost to unsuspecting tourists, in the expectation that profits would be recouped from commissions delivered by shopping centres selling souvenirs and local produce set up along highways for the specific purpose of syphoning cash from tour groups.
In Diqing, a lucrative way to extract cash from tourists was to sell them local herbal remedies such as the prized caterpillar fungus, literally worth more than its weight in gold. The scams here are similar to those in many other parts of China. As tourists are ushered into the roadside warehouses, a fake shopper known as a tuo 托 would appear, and, speaking in the group's native dialect, exclaim the value and quality of the fungus being sold. The tuo would order a large quantity, the group's guide might Diqing's regional tourism investment company purchased the Balegezong Gorge, a premier tourist attraction, only to on-sell it to the bigger investment company owned by Yunnan province itself. As one local businessman observed: 'it's like watching fish being eaten by bigger and bigger fish'.
The Big Fish
In the past few years of studying economic development in the south-west, As economic conditions worsened for private businesses, they turned to banks for loans, but were often refused -the SOEs having hoovered up local banks' available capital. Under Xi, banks across China have tightened their lending standards -especially when it comes to private firms. As one ex-local banker told me, These days, if you lend a businessman money and he defaults, you will be suspected of corruption and investigated. If you lend an SOE money and it can't meet repayments, the leaders will arrange for countless extensions. If the SOE defaults it's nothing more than an internal administrative problem. The bank won't be blamed. So why would banks lend to private firms when SOEs are so hungry for capital?
Chinese banks typically require private firms to pay a deposit of equal value to the loan amount or provide collateral of up to four or five times the value of the loan. As in other parts of China, some firms use equity (stock) in their company as collateral, forfeiting ownership if they default.
Through such defaults, SOEs across China have been able to buy private firms and their assets on the cheap.
One hotel owner I spoke to had mortgaged his house to secure a business loan, estimating his house to be worth more than double the loan Local entrepreneurs can still pick up subcontracting work from SOEs, but their profits were squeezed to such an extent that it is not worth it. And
SOEs are expanding so rapidly they are moving into spheres of economic activity that had once been the exclusive domain of the private sector -for example, boutique hotels and resorts. Their resources and political connections have made SOEs formidable competitors. One hotelier told me he had been fined a large sum by the police because a staff member had made a mistake when entering a foreign guest's passport number into the police-controlled online guest registration system. He maintained that no SOE-run hotel would have been subjected to such a fine.
Who Will Advance, and Who Will Retreat?
In the face of such pressures, some local businessmen have decided to retire, investing their money in stocks and mutual funds. In other parts of China, some entrepreneurs would prefer to invest abroad, but capital controls have made this difficult.
